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INTRODUCTION

Until the 1950s only state statutes and constitutions, as construed by state courts, protected citizens from unlawful state governmental interference with their rights and liberties.' During the
1950s, however, the United States Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, 2 began to adopt an expansionist reading of the federal constitution. In the 1960s the Court selectively incorporated most of the provisions of the federal Bill of3
Rights into the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantees.
Thus, the Warren Court's increasingly broad view of constitutional
standards and safeguards allowed Supreme Court review of executive and legislative action on the state level and, consequently,
pressured state courts to apply these federal standards and safeguards to cases arising within their jurisdictions.4
As part of its expansionist reading of the Constitution, the
Warren Court greatly broadened the scope of constitutional standards regulating law enforcement procedures and protecting the
rights of criminal defendants.5 Miranda v. Arizona," which required state law enforcement officials to advise criminal suspects of
their fifth amendment rights before subjecting them to custodial
interrogation, was one of the Court's most controversial 7 criminal
procedure decisions. As Miranda and other Warren Court decisions 8 increasingly required state courts to apply federal constitutional standards and to give criminal defendants more protection
1.

See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90

HARV. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977); Newman, The "Old Federalism".Protection of Individual

Rights by State Courts in an Era of Federal Court Passivity, 15 CONN. L. REv. 21, 22 (1982).
2. Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court from 1953 to 1969.
3. The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying an individual due process
of law or equal protection of the laws. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (recognizing right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967) (ensuring right to speedy and public trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363
(1966) (granting right to trial by impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(granting right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (recognizing privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (ensuring assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (adopting fourth amendment exclusionary
rule); see also Swindler, Minimum Standards of ConstitutionalJustice: FederalFloor and
State Ceiling, 49 Mo. L. REv. 1, 4 (1984).
4. Cf. Brennan, supra note 1, at 490.
5. See Saltzburg, Foreward: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional CriminalProcedure
in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEo. L.J. 151, 152 (1980).
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. See Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 152.
8. For a list of these other decisions, see supra note 3.
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than that provided by the state's constitution,9 state courts considering individual liberties questions relied almost exclusively on
federal law and ignored their state constitutions. Thus, the 1950s
and early 1960s marked a period of dormancy for state constitutional jurisprudence. 10
In the late 1960s a change in the composition of the United
States Supreme Court" signalled an end to the activism of the
Warren Court years. The Burger Court has played a more passive
role in safeguarding the interests of criminal suspects. 12 In construing the scope of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, Burger Court decisions have restricted the mandates
of Miranda and have diluted substantially that decision's protection of criminal defendants. In response to federal court passivity
and retrenchment in the 1970s and 1980s, some state courts are
relying again on their state constitutions and are interpreting them
as providing greater protection in many areas than the federal
constitution.1 3
This Note examines how state courts have interpreted state
constitutional guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination
independently of the Supreme Court's construction of the fifth
amendment. Part II focuses on the historical and theoretical underpinnings of state constitutional law and examines state courts'
renewed reliance on their state constitutions. Part III discusses the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment in Miranda and its progeny. Part IV presents the states' response to Supreme Court holdings and surveys state court decisions interpreting state constitutions' self-incrimination provisions more broadly
than the fifth amendment. Finally, Part V examines the potential
for further growth in this area of state constitutional jurisprudence
and encourages state courts to develop reasoned, independent interpretations of state self-incrimination provisions.
9. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 493; cf. Pollack, State Constitutions as Separate
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 711 (1983) ("During [the 1950s
and 1960s], state government was regarded sometimes not as part of the answer, but as part
of the societal problem.").
10. See Comment, Individual Rights and State ConstitutionalInterpretations:Putting First Things First,37 BAYLOR L. REv. 493, 493-94 (1985); Developments, The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1338-40 (1982).
11. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
12. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 495-96; Newman, supra note 1, at 23; Comment,
supra note 10, at 493.
13. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 495.
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RESURGENCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Historical Origins of State Law Primacy

By 1776 most American citizens enjoyed guarantees against
encroachment on their liberties by state governments because most
of the original thirteen colonies had adopted constitutions with
provisions protecting individual rights. 14 The framers of the federal
Bill of Rights, which the states adopted in 1791, naturally relied on
these state provisions as sources for their document. The federal
document sought to provide citizens with protections against interference by the federal government analogous to existing state constitutional protections against interference by state governments.1 5
For the first one hundred and fifty years of our nation's existence, the origins of state constitutional provisions were of little
import for federal constitutional jurisprudence. During this period
the federal constitution and state constitutions operated independently in regulating the interaction between government and citizen. 16 The federal Bill of Rights protected citizens only from actions of the federal government,17 while state constitutions limited
only intrusive action by the states. 8 Because state governments affected individuals far more frequently during this period than did
the federal government, state constitutions were the primary documents protecting the liberties of the people from governmental
interference.1 9
14. See Note, Expanding State Constitutional Protectionsand the New Silver Platter: After They've Shut the Door, Can They Bar the Window?, 8 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 186, 196
n.60 (1976); cf. Developments, supra note 10, at 1326-27.
15. Comment, supra note 10, at 497; Note, supra note 14, at 196. This derivation of
the Bill of Rights from preexisting state constitutional provisions indicates that states which
adopted constitutions after 1791 and modelled their guarantees of individual liberties after
the Bill of Rights also benefited from the various state constitutions drafted during the
-evolutionary period. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 501. For example, the individual rights
provisions contained in the Illinois Constitution of 1818 reflect the wording of early state
constitutions more closely than that of the Bill of Rights. Note, supra note 14, at 196 &
n.63.
16.

Cf. Developments, supra note 10, at 1327-28.

17.

See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833).

18.

Brennan, supra note 1, at 502.

19. See Newman, supra note 1, at 22; cf. Swindler, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that
du.ing the nineteenth century, state constitutions "remained the seedbed for new ideas
seeking to deal with changing national life").
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B. The Warren Court and Federal Expansion
of Individual Rights
Adoption of the fourteenth amendment2 0 into the federal constitution in 1868 marked the beginning of the end of the state constitutions' primacy. The amendment allowed federal courts to review state legislative and executive actions.21 In the first few
decades following passage of the fourteenth amendment, several
Supreme Court decisions22 held that the amendment's guarantees
of due process and equal protection did not incorporate any of the
Bill of Rights' protections. s In 1925, however, the Court began to
expand its construction of the fourteenth amendment and apply
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. 24 During the
1950s and 1960s the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Warren,
"nationalized" federal constitutional rights by selectively incorporating most of the provisions in the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment's prohibitions.25 Federal constitutional law,
therefore, became a frequent subject of consideration in state court
26
cases for the first time.

The Warren Court's activist stance regarding criminal procedure and individual liberties required state judges to apply federal
law and, consequently, to restrict the exercise of state governmental power more tightly than had been required formerly by state
constitutions.2 7 Although state court judges remained free to inter20. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law: nor deny to any
person.., the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
21. Cf. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3
(1956).
22. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
263-68 (1886); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552-56 (1875).
23. Brennan, supra note 1, at 493. In 1897, however, the Supreme Court did hold that

the fourteenth amendment's due process clause required a state to compensate an individual whose property was taken for public use. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
241 (1897).
24. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that first amendment

guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press applied to states). Prior to this
period, state court judges concerned themselves primarily with interpreting and applying

state law; litigation of issues of federal law occurred mostly in federal courts. See Brennan,
supra note 1, at 490.

25. See Swindler, supra note 3, at 4; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. In
addition to the federal courts' broadening interpretation of the fourteenth amendment as
incorporating certain Bill of Rights protections, the importance of federal law increased

because of the immense growth of the federal government beginning in the 1930s and 1940s.
See Brennan, supra note 1, at 490.
26. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 490-91; cf. Developments, supra note 10, at 1340.

27. Cf. Pollack, supra note 9, at 711; Note, supra note 14, at 200.
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pret their state constitutions independently, 2 the federal constitution's supremacy clause 29 mandated that evolving federal constitutional standards guaranteed to all citizens a minimal level of rights
that state courts were required to protect under the fourteenth
amendment.3 0 Thus, the Warren Court's expansion of federal
rights necessarily diminished those areas in which only state law
governed the individual's relationship with the state.3 1 By limiting
the applicability of state constitutional principles, incorporation of
the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment tended to negate
the functional independence of the individual liberties provisions
in state constitutions.3 2 As state court judges turned their attention from state constitutions to the federal constitution, state constitutional jurisprudence languished and federal law dominated in
regulating the relationship between citizen and state."
Notwithstanding the expansion of federal constitutional law,
the nation's federal system of government continued to provide a
framework for dual level protection of individual rights. Although
Supreme Court decisions bind state courts resolving federal issues,
state courts remain free to interpret their state constitutions in
any way that does not conflict with federally guaranteed rights.3
Furthermore, a state court decision is final if it is based on state
law that is independent of federal law and adequate to support the
decision because the Supreme Court cannot review decisions based
on independent and adequate state grounds.3 5 Rather, a state's authority to interpret its own laws finds its bounds only in the
supremacy clause s6 and in the minimal level of rights guaranteed
by the federal constitution.
During the Warren Court era, state courts addressing issues
28. See Elison & NettikSimmons, Federalismand State Constitutions:The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REV. 177, 178 (1984).
29. U.S. CONST. art VI, ]] 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof,.. . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
30. See Developments, supra note 10, at 1334.
31. Id. at 1337-38.
32. See Comment, supra note 10, at 493-94, 496.
33. See Developments, supra note 10, at 1338-40.
34. See Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 28, at 179; Newman, supra note 1, at 25.
35. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 590 (1875); Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 28, at 180-93 (discussing the statutory basis and judicial development
of the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine).
36. See supra note 29.
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concerning individual liberties made little use of the independent
and adequate state grounds doctrine. State courts constitutionally
could not provide less protection for individual liberties than those
required by the federal constitution, and most state courts had no
desire to provide greater protections than those mandated by Warren Court decisions.37 The resulting habitual application of federal
law to individual liberties questions gave rise to what one judge
characterized as "the pernicious notion that any practice that
withstood constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court was fair
game for state and local officials. The federal constitutional standard . . .became a dividing line between the forbidden and the

common place."38
C. Burger Court Passivity and State Court Activism
The Warren Court era of Supreme Court activism came to an
end in 1969. The addition of two Nixon appointees,39 including
Chief Justice Warren Burger, to the Bench foreshadowed a shift in
the Court's vision of its judicial role and its attitude toward individual liberties. Commentators, however, disagree on the magnitude of the philosophical change that resulted from the Court's
change in composition. While some commentators argue that the
Burger Court has adhered to the basic principles and decisions of
the Warren Court, 40 others vehemently charge that the current Supreme Court has grown disenchanted with the broad protections
previously granted to individual liberties and has acted to narrow
these protections substantially.4'1 Few commentators, however,
would disagree with charges that the Burger Court has not continued the expansion of federally guaranteed liberties initiated by the
Warren Court or that the Court's holdings on the constitutionality
of law enforcement practices have departed from the spirit, if not
the letter, of Warren Court precedents. 2
The Burger Court's rejection of the Warren Court's broad
37. Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 28, at 191.
38. Newman, supra note 1, at 25. Judge Newman sits on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
39. See infra note 109.
40. See Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1319, 1324 (1977); Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 153.
41. Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 28, at 178 (declaring that the U.S. Supreme
Court "is no longer the conscience of a nation"); see also Comment, supra note 10, at 493;
Note, New York v. Quarles: The Dissolution of Miranda, 30 VML.L. REv. 441, 441 (1985).
42. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA.L. Rav. 873, 874 (1976); Israel, supra note 40, at 1366.
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readings of Bill of Rights guarantees in the criminal procedure
context, coupled with its practice of vacating, as misinterpretations
of federal precedent, state court decisions giving overbroad protections to individual liberties,4 3 has caused a growing number of state
courts 44 to turn to their state constitutions and give independent
substance to the guarantees contained therein.45 Thus, state courts
43. The Burger Court also increased the number of writs it granted to state prosecutors complaining of state courts providing overbroad protection to defendants' rights. See
Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 28, at 192.
44. The majority of state courts continue either to consider only federal law in resolving constitutional claims or to interpret state constitutional guarantees of liberties as automatically identical to their federal counterparts. Note, supra note 14, at 195-96.
45. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 495. Scholars and judges have expressed a variety of
viewpoints on the methodology of state constitutional interpretation. One commentator has
identified three general approaches that courts may use in defining the relationship of state
and federal constitutions. Under the "primacy" or "first things first" approach, the state
court first decides, as a matter of state law, the individual liberty claim asserted. Only if the
challenged activity is constitutional under state law does the court consider the federal constitution. By contrast, the "supplemental" or "interstitial" approach directs the state court
to consider the constitutionality of the state's activity as a matter of federal law and then to
look at the state constitution only if it finds the activity permissible under federal law.
Finally, a state court may analyze relevant provisions of both state and federal constitutions
whenever it considers fundamental liberties issues. See Pollack, supra note 9, at 717-18. For
additional discussion of the above approaches, see Hill & Marks, Foreword: Toward a Federalist System of Rights, 1984 ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 1, 10-11; Linde, First Things First:Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
Commentators disagree on what justification, if any, a state court need offer for diverging from a Supreme Court holding on a particular question. Arguably, state courts should
not view United States Supreme Court holdings as presumptively valid because of the
inherent institutional and functional differences between state courts and constitutions and
the United States Supreme Court and Constitution. In addition, requiring a state to justify
state law deviations from federal precedent may effectively stifle the growth of independent
bodies of state constitutional law. See Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REv. 353 (1984).
Nonetheless, various pressures have led commentators, courts, and attorneys to develop
objectively identifiable criteria to justify divergent state law interpretations. See id. at 35657. Those who place a premium on federal supremacy and uniformity of law demand clear
justifications from a state court forsaking those values. See Pollack, supra note 9, at 721
(asserting that South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), "requires [a] state court [to]
carefully set forth the reasons that it believes the state constitution leads to a different
result"); cf. Schaefer, supra note 21, at 6-7 (discussing the Supreme Court's advantages over
state courts in the area of criminal procedure).
Charges that state judges are result-oriented, combined with fears that unjustified constitutional holdings might be overruled by constitutional amendment or that the Supreme
Court might restrict its application of the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine
have spurred state courts to articulate objective criteria in hopes of endowing their decisions
with legitimacy. See Williams, supra, at 356-58, 385-87. Justice Handler's concurring opinion in State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982), lists the following criteria justifying a
different interpretation: (1) textual differences in the constitutions; (2) legislative history
showing that a broader meaning for the provision was intended; (3) state law predating a
Supreme Court decision; (4) differences in the structure of federal and state constitutions;
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are rediscovering their own constitutional jurisprudence. 6
Recent state court decisions have relied on state constitutions
to provide alternative grounds of decision in cases in which federal
constitutional rights are asserted,4 7 to create new law by resolving
issues not yet conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court,4 8 and to
provide greater protections to individual liberties than those
required by Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill of Rights. 49
Although the supremacy clause proscribes reliance on a state constitution as a way to cut back on federally guaranteed protections,
the Supreme Court has recognized a state's authority to provide
greater protections for the rights of its citizens.5 0
D. Responses to State Court Activism
The resurgence of state constitutional law in the area of fundamental liberties has generated a variety of critical responses.
Some commentators laud the state courts' reassertion of their role
as independent interpreters of state constitutions5 1 and characterize their reliance on state constitutions as reflecting the basic principles of federalism on which our nation was founded.5 2 Those
scholars, judges, and attorneys who miss the expansive protections
of individual liberties established by Warren Court decisions recognize state constitutional interpretation as a viable means of
(5) a subject matter of particular state or local interest; (6) a particular state history or
tradition; and (7) public attitudes in the state. Id. at 363-68, 450 A.2d at 965-67.
46. Commentators have dubbed the resurgence of state constitutional law "the most
significant current development in our constitutional jurisprudence," Pollack, supra note 9,
at 707 (Foreward by Justice Brennan), and "the dominant theme" in current constitutional
doctrine, Swindler, supra note 3, at 15.
47. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 461 So. 2d 644 (La. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Munson,
126 N.H. 191, 489 A.2d 646 (1985).
48. See, e.g., People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984); People v.
Gonyea, 421 Mich. 462, 365 N.W.2d 136 (1984).
49. See, e.g., State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216 (1978); Taylor v. State,
612 P.2d 851 (Wyo. 1980).
50. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (recognizing that "[a] State is free as
a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards") (emphasis added);
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
51. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 503; Swindler, supra note 3, at 15; Note, supra note
14, at 195.
52. See Pollack, supra note 9, at 708. One judge writes: "The federal Constitution,
whether construed narrowly or broadly, remains what it was always intended to be: the
outer limits of permissible governmental action. But within those limits, there remain vast
responsibilities for striking the appropriate balance between order and liberty." Newman,
supra note 1, at 25.
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renewing those protections." Indeed, Justice William Brennan has
applauded state decisions that go beyond federal requirements in
54
safeguarding liberties.
Not everyone, however, sees the growth of an independent
body of state constitutional law as a positive step. Some judges and
commentators claim that the development robs constitutional
interpretation of consistency and uniformity5 5 and argue that the
regulation of law enforcement investigatory practices demands
those qualities.56 Other commentators assert that state court decisions diverging from Supreme Court holdings often are unprincipled "evasions" of Supreme Court decisions that state court judges
find unpersuasive or ideologically distasteful." Former Chief Justice Warren Burger's reaction to independent state interpretations
stands in marked contrast to Justice Brennan's.5 8 In his concurring
opinion in Florida v. Casals,59 Chief Justice Burger applauded an
amendment to the Florida Constitution that required Florida's
state courts to interpret the state constitution's search and seizure
provisions as coextensive with federal fourth amendment rights.8 0
Burger urged state citizens to be aware of their "power to amend
61
state law to insure rational law enforcement. .
The Supreme Court's distrust of state court decisions that
53. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
54. See Brennan, supra note 1; Howard, supra note 42, at 874. In his dissent in Michigan v. Mosley, Justice Brennan reminded states of their ability to assume an independent
role in protecting their citizens:
In light of today's erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of federal constitutional
law, it is appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher standards under state law. . . .Understandably, state courts and legislatures are, as matters of state law, increasingly according protections once provided as
federal rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of this Court.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750
(1972); Note, State Constitutional Guaranteesas Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court
Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 737 (1976).
56. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 119, 545 P.2d 272, 284, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360,
372 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
57. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. 462 U.S. 637 (1983).
60. FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 12, as popularly amended in 1982, provides:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or
information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if
such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States
Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
61. 462 U.S. at 639.

1986]

MIRANDA

1703

diverge from prior Supreme Court holdings is illustrated in the
Court's 1983 decision in Michigan v. Long.2 Prior to Long, the
Burger Court, in a series of cases, had interpreted the independent
and adequate state grounds doctrine restrictively so that it could
review an increasing number of state court constitutional decisions.6 3 In Long, however, the Court went beyond narrowing its
construction of "independent" and established a new test for the
reviewability of state court decisions. The Court held that a state
court's mere reference to its state constitution no longer establishes independent and adequate state grounds if the state court
also relies on federal law.64 Instead, the Court indicated that if the
independence and adequacy of the state grounds are not made
clear in the state court's opinion, the Supreme Court will presume
that the state court decided the case as it did because it believed
that it was required to do so by federal precedent.65 Thus, under
Long a state court that considers federal precedent still may preclude Supreme Court review, but only by making explicit the state
grounds for the decision. 66
The Long decision attempts to achieve doctrinal consistency
and to balance due respect for state court autonomy with the goal
of uniform application of federal law. 7 Critics of Long, however,
agree that the decision stifles the system of dual protections envisioned by the federal system. Furthermore, the Court's greater
willingness to review state court cases that discuss federal precedent may lead state courts, fearing review, to develop a state constitutional jurisprudence that totally ignores the reasoned body of
federal constitutional law.6 9
Both a majority of the United States Supreme Court and vari62. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
63. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See generally
Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 28, at 193-95. The Burger Court indicated that it
would view a state court's reliance on federal decisions and reasoning as a sign of nonindependent state grounds. No longer could a state court escape review merely by identifying
and relying on an adequate state ground. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 652-53.
64. 463 U.S. at 1044.
65. Id. at 1040-41.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1039-40.
68. See Collins, PlainStatements: The Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70 A.BA.
J., March 1984, at 92, 94.
69. See Hill & Marks, supra note 45, at 10-11; Developments, supra note 10, at 134245 (suggesting a test for reviewability that focuses on the adequacy of state grounds and the
presence of countervailing federal interests).
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ous commentators continue to view with suspicion a state court

decision that relies on its state constitution as grounds for rejecting
a Supreme Court holding. Nonetheless, the high courts of some
states continue to assert their autonomy. One area of constitutional law in which state courts have developed independent interpretations is the criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Examining the Supreme Court's evolving reading of the
fifth amendment over the past twenty years and the corresponding
response of dissenting state courts to these readings provides an
apt illustration of the broader trend toward state constitutional
independence as a reaction to federal court passivity.
III. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-THE FEDERAL
COURSE

A.

Life Before Miranda

0
Although one commentator has characterized Miranda7
as an
7
"abrupt departure from precedent," ' a body of federal constitutional law regarding the inadmissibility of confessions had previously developed over the course of the twentieth century.72 Drawing on the historical common-law exclusion of physically coerced,
and hence untrustworthy, confessions, the United States Supreme
Court held in 1936 that the government's physical coercion of a
suspect to obtain a confession violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, that the confession was
inadmissible. 73 Later decisions extended the rule to include admis74
sions that were the involuntary result of psychological coercion.

70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 200.
72. See generally Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 408-10 (1982); Casenote, Is Michigan Out of "Focus" on
Miranda Warnings?: People v. Belanger, 1984 DEr. C.L. REv. 795, 799-802; Note, supra note
41, at 441-46.
73. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The confessions at issue in Brown were
clearly untrustworthy. It is not altogether clear whether Brown's holding would exclude
physically coerced confessions bolstered by independent guarantees of trustworthiness.
Note, supra note 41, at 443-44 & n.15. The Supreme Court discussed applying the fifth
amendment to involuntary confessions in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), but
later Supreme Court cases largely ignored Brain. Note, supra note 41, at 443 n.13. Of course,
at the time the Court decided Brown, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied only against the federal government, not against the state governments. See
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
74. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (holding confession made to police
psychiatrist posing as physician treating defendant to be inadmissible); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949) (holding inadmissible a confession made after six days of incommunicado
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By the mid-1950s federal courts were articulating two tests for
excluding involuntary confessions.7 The common-law "forced"
confession exclusion deemed compelled confessions untrustworthy
unless other evidence proved the confession's reliability.76 By contrast, the "police methods" test evidenced judicial concern with
the illegal methods that police used to compel confessions. This
test excluded illegally compelled confessions as a form of illegally
seized evidence. 7 The Court applied these tests in case-by-case
determinations of the voluntariness of a confession after examining
the totality of each case's circumstances.7 8
For a variety of reasons the Supreme Court experienced growing dissatisfaction with the voluntariness standard in the early
1960s. Aside from the difficulties inherent in defining "voluntary,"
the requirement of a case-by-case analysis created an ambiguous
standard. 79 The resulting unpredictability of outcomes left police
with no specific rules for interrogation practices.8 0 In addition, the
importance of factual determinations in applying the standard
often required appellate courts to defer to trial court findings.
Thus, the appellate courts left lower courts relatively free to admit
confessions of questionable constitutionality."1
In order to combat the ambiguity of the voluntariness standard, the Supreme Court invoked a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel8 2 as grounds for excluding confessions.
confinement and interrogation).
75. See Schaefer, supra note 21, at 12-13; Casenote, supra note 72, at 800 n.28.
76. Schaefer, supra note 21, at 12.
77. See id. at 12-13. Justice Frankfurter's statement in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952), reflects this concern: "Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal
trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play
and decency." Id. at 173.
78. See Note, supra note 41, at 445 & n.26. The Court considered such circumstances
as age and intelligence of the defendant, unlawful arrest, delay in arraignment or lengthy
interrogation, and deception by police. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)
(lengthy interrogation); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (same); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (unlawful arrest and defendant's intelligence); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954) (police deception); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951) (delay in arraignment); Hailey v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (suspect's age).
79. See Note, supra note 41, at 445-46.
80. See Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 413-14.
81. Id. at 413; cf. Schaefer, supra note 21, at 14.
82. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The Court's 1964 decision in Massiah v. United States3 held that
a defendant has a right to the assistance of counsel during any
interrogation following his indictment. The Court declared that a
post-indictment confession elicited in the absence of counsel was
an inadmissible violation of the defendant's sixth amendment
rights.8 4 Escobedo v. Illinois5 extended Massiah by holding that
the right to counsel arises as soon as a police investigation focuses
on the accused and seeks to secure his confession.s Escobedo, however, failed to clarify when a suspect becomes the focus of a police
investigation. 7 Therefore, the point at which the sixth amendment
right to counsel arises remained unclear. In 1966 the Court shifted
its consideration to the fifth amendment s and in Miranda v. Arizona89 relied on the privilege against self-incrimination in setting
forth a per se rule regarding the admissibility of confessions.
B.

The Miranda Decision

In Miranda the United States Supreme Court considered the
admissibility of confessions elicited from a criminal defendant during police interrogation." The Court granted certiorari in the case
with the express purpose of providing objective constitutional
guidelines that courts and law enforcement agencies could follow. 1
Thus, the Court sought to replace the uncertainty of the voluntari92
ness standard with a cut and dried, objective standard.
The Court considered methods of police interrogation at
length and found that the atmosphere and environment of custodial interrogation were designed to intimidate a suspect and make
him submit to the interrogator's will. 98 The Court concluded that
83. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
84. Id. at 206.
85. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
86. Id. at 492.
87. See generally Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States
and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1964); Comment, The Curious Confusion
Surrounding Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 560 (1965).
88. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
89. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. Id. at 439.
91. Id. at 441-42.
92. The Court expressly rejected the totality of the circumstances test to determine
voluntariness. "Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be
more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact." Id. at 468-69 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 445-58.
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no statement obtained from a defendant during custodial interrogation can be truly the product of the defendant's free choice
unless he is adequately protected from the "compulsion inherent
in custodial surroundings.

' 94

Furthermore, the Court held that the

fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied during the period of custodial interrogation" and mandated that a
suspect be able to exercise his own free will in deciding whether to
speak or remain silent. To combat the pressures of interrogation
and to ensure that a criminal suspect has an opportunity to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination, the Court set forth
procedural guidelines for informing the suspect of his rights.9 6
In establishing the procedure for warning a person in custody
of his rights, the Court deemed the warning to be "an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." 97 The Court also held that an accused's assertion of his right to remain silent requires all interrogation to cease
and that an assertion of the right to counsel should cut short any
further interrogation until counsel is present.9 8 If a suspect answers
questions in the absence of counsel, Miranda imposes on the prosecution a heavy burden of proving that the accused knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights.9
The Court held that, in the absence of other effective safeguards,100 the warnings and waiver of rights prescribed in its opin94. Id. at 458.
95. Id. at 461.
96. Id. at 467. The Court's opinion requires that police clearly inform a suspect, prior
to interrogation, that he possesses the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and
will be used against him in court, that he has the right to consult with counsel and have
counsel with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed
to represent him. Id. at 467-73.
97. Id. at 468.
98. Id. at 473-74.
99. Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)).
100. The Court's discussion of alternative safeguards stated that
[Ilt is impossible for us to forsee the potential alternatives protecting the privilege
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rulemaking capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards
must be observed.
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ion are fundamental to protecting one's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and that a failure to meet these requirements would result in the inadmissibility of all statements made
by a defendant. 101 Thus, Miranda barred the prosecution from
using any statement, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, obtained
from a criminal defendant during custodial interrogation unless
the prosecution could show it had complied with the procedural
safeguards established in Miranda.'0°
The Supreme Court's division 10 3 in Miranda foreshadowed in04
tense public and scholarly controversy over the decision.1
Miranda'simpact lay in its discard of a case-by-case voluntariness
analysis in favor of a "bright line" test of admissibility. By establishing a prophylactic rule requiring specific warnings, the Court
hoped to mold police behavior. 10 5 By establishing the procedural
safeguards as constitutional requirements, the Court made a violation of Miranda'srule a violation of a fifth amendment right that,
according to some commentators, gave Mirandaa symbolic quality
extending far beyond the decision's actual impact on police interrogation techniques. 0 6 The decision's critics, however, questioned
the legitimacy of Miranda'sarticulated historical and textual basis
and predicted a severe deleterious effect on the ability of police to
07
gather evidence.'
During the years following Miranda the Warren Court
adhered to the principles it established in that decision.' 08 Changes
384 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 476.
101. Id. at 476.
102. Id. at 478-79.
103. Miranda was a five-four decision. Justices Clark, Harlan and White wrote dissenting opinions. See id. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id.
at 526 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and White joined in Justice Harlan's dissent.
Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in Justice White's dissent.
104. See Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 199.
105. See id.; Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 415; Note, supra note 41, at 447-48.
106. Israel, supra note 40, at 1374; see Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 415.
107. See 384 U.S. at 506-13, 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Two decades after its decision, Miranda continues to engender spirited debate. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1985); White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
VAND. L. Rav. 1 (1986). For additional views, see Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966); Interrogationof Criminal Defendant - Some Views on
Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (1966).
108. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (holding that a suspect is "in custody"
for purposes of Miranda when "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way");
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (declaring that Miranda applies to the interrogation of a suspect about an offense unrelated to the offense for which he was detained).
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in the composition of the Court during the period from 1969 to
1972,109 however, placed the continued force and longevity of
Miranda in question. The replacement of three members of the
Miranda majority with Nixon appointees signalled a potential
change in constitutional interpretations.
C. The Burger Court's Treatment of Miranda.
Commentators have expressed mixed views on how far the
Burger Court has retreated from the Warren Court's precedent in
Miranda. Reactions to the Burger Court's treatment of Miranda
range from one commentator's statement that Burger Court decisions have "misstated the meaning of Miranda by focusing on an
unnecessary and arbitrary factual distinction" and are "diametrically opposed to the spirit of Miranda," 110 to another's conclusion
that the Court has "adhered to [Miranda's] basic holding." ' Unquestionably, however, the Burger Court quickly set clear limits on
Miranda's potentially far-reaching implications.
In the 1971 case of Harris v. New York,112 the Court considered whether the prosecution could use a defendant's statement,
made during a custodial interrogation not preceded by a warning
regarding the accused's right to counsel, to impeach the defendant
on the stand. The Court found that Mirandaclearly proscribed use
of the statement in the prosecution's case-in-chief, but that
Miranda did not bar other uses of the statement. 113 Disregarding
Miranda's finding that all statements obtained without warnings
were presumptively coerced, the Court held the incriminating
statement admissible for impeachment purposes 1 4 because its
trustworthiness
satisfied
traditional,
pre-Miranda legal
1
1
5
standards.
109. President Nixon appointed Warren Burger to the Supreme Court, as Chief Justice, in 1969 to replace Chief Justice Warren. The next year Nixon appointed Justice Blackmun to replace Justice Fortas. One commentator described the change in the composition of
the Bench as follows: "Suddenly, the razor-thin majority for Mirandahas been transformed
into a majority which was profoundly unsympathetic not only to Miranda,but also to much
of the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence." Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 417.
In 1972 President Nixon appointed Justice Rehnquist to fill the vacancy created by Justice
Black's death.
110. Id. at 419, 429.
111. Saltzburg, supra note 5,at 202; cf. Israel, supra note 40, at 1375.
112. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
113. Id. at 223-24.
114. Id. at 226.
115. Id. at 224. The defendant in Harris made no claim that his statements were
involuntary or coerced. Id.
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In refusing to exclude the incriminating statement, the Court
reasoned that a rule disallowing the admission of evidence violating Miranda in the prosecution's case-in-chief would sufficiently
deter impermissible police conduct.1 1 6 This shift in the Court's
focus, from the protection of individual liberties to the ascertainment of factual guilt, appears in Chief Justice Burger's opinion.
The Chief Justice declared that "[t]he shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
defense, free1 from
7
utterances.'
Many commentators criticized Harris for limiting the precedential value of Miranda's sweeping constitutional language to
Miranda'sspecific facts." 8 One commentator predicted that Harris
would limit significantly the deterrent effect of Miranda because
an incriminating statement available only for impeachment use
would remain more attractive to police than no statement at all."1 9
Furthermore, because an accused who took the stand would not be
able to vary much from his original statement, taken in violation of
Miranda,without suffering impeachment, applying Harris'holding
would ensure that the prosecutor knows the content of the defense
testimony in advance of trial. 120
Burger Court decisions in the years following Harrisgenerally
continued a pattern of verbally reaffirming Miranda's holding
while limiting the decision's application and weakening its under22
2
lying assumptions.' ' The 1974 decision of Michigan v. Tucker
116. Id. at 225.
117. Id. at 226. Chief Justice Warren's language in Miranda expressed a different
focus. "[T]he Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with
the power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged." 384 U.S.
at 479.
118. See Israel, supra note 40, at 1378-79 & n.260; Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 42021. Some commentators, however, merely deem Harris a reflection of the Court's emphasis
on the truth-finding function of a trial. See Comment, Impeachment, Use Immunity and
the PerjuriousDefendant, 77 DicK. L. REv. 23, 34 (1972) (noting that "the Court is revitalizing the idea that where the impeachment is relevant and probative, it may be employed as
a prosecutorial tactic when the defendant puts his credibility into issue").
119. Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 421.
120. See Israel, supra note 40, at 1379. For an in-depth discussion of Harris,see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971). In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975), the Supreme Court extended the rationale of Harris to statements obtained after a
suspect, having received his Mirandawarnings, requested to consult with a lawyer.
121. But see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that once an accused
invokes his right to have counsel present during interrogation, he is not subject to further
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dealt a severe blow to the constitutional nature of Miranda's procedural requirements. In deciding on the admissibility of evidence
given by a witness whose name the police obtained from an
accused who had not received the Miranda warning, the Court
considered whether Miranda rendered the evidence an inadmissible "fruit of the poisonous tree.' 123 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, concluded that Miranda did not bar the evidence. 12 4
Justice Rehnquist asserted that Miranda'swarnings are not themselves constitutionally protected rights, but instead are mere safeguards of a constitutional right. The failure to give a warning does
not itself violate the fifth amendment. 2 5 Thus, the evidence in
question was not the "fruit" of a constitutional violation. Because
the Court found that the accused's statements to police were
neither coerced nor involuntary under a traditional analysis 2 6 and
that the need for all relevant evidence outweighed the deterrence
value of exclusion, 27 the Court held the evidence admissible.
Unlike Harris,which strictly limited Miranda to its specific
facts, Tucker denied the constitutional legitimacy of Miranda's
edict. 28 Justice Rehnquist's opinion impliedly rejected Miranda's
contention that the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation
makes all statements involuntary unless preceded by Miranda
warnings. The warnings, therefore, according to Tucker, are not
fundamental to the fifth amendment right. Instead, Justice Rehnquist looked to the voluntariness of the accused's statements and
balanced the costs and benefits of exclusion, an approach antitheti29
cal to Miranda.
In decisions addressing other implications of Miranda, the
interrogation until counsel is made available); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (excluding evidence from psychiatric examination of the defendant not preceded by Mirandawarnings); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (declaring that Miranda's requirements
come into play when a suspect in custody is subjected to express questioning or its functional equivalent); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (holding that once an accused receives
Miranda warnings, his decision to remain silent cannot be used by the prosecution for
impeachment purposes).
122. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
123. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine excludes evidence obtained as the
direct or indirect product of a constitutional violation. The exclusion encompasses both
physical and verbal evidence tainted by the lawless conduct. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).
124. 417 U.S. at 450.
125. Id. at 444.
126. Id. at 444-46.
127. Id. at 450-51.
128. Soneshein, supra note 72, at 428.
129. See id. at 428-29; Note, supra note 41, at 453.
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Supreme Court continued to read Miranda's language strictly and
resolved ambiguities in a manner that limited the scope of the
accused's fifth amendment rights. In Michigan v. Mosley13 0 the
Court considered whether, once a suspect has asserted his right to
remain silent and interrogation ceases, the police may, after the
passage of hours, reissue Miranda warnings and resume interrogation. 13 1 Although a reading of Miranda implies that police may not
resume questioning, 13 2 the Court in Mosley held that Miranda cannot sensibly be read as requiring an absolute prohibition of indefinite duration upon further questioning.'3 3 Instead, as long as police
"scrupulously honored"'1 4 the initial assertion of the right, they
could later reissue warnings and resume questioning. The Court
in
found that police met the "scrupulously honored" standard
35
Miranda.
under
admissible
Mosley and held the confession
Similarly, in North Carolina v. Butler 3 6 the Court refused to
accept the implications of Miranda in determining the govern37
ment's burden of proving a waiver of fifth amendment rights.'
Although Mirandafails to specify the elements required to prove a
waiver, the decision may be read as establishing that evidence of
an express statement of waiver, followed closely by statements to
police, is necessary to prove a waiver. 38 The Butler Court, however, found that Miranda established no per se rule requiring an
express waiver and that less evidence could prove, in light of the
circumstances, a valid waiver. 3 9 Butler had received Miranda
warnings and indicated a willingness to talk to police, but refused
to sign a waiver form. He then made incriminating statements."10
The Court implied a waiver from these facts and held admissible
130. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
131. Police arrested the suspect in Mosley in connection with certain robberies and
issued proper Miranda warnings to him. Mosley declined to answer questions about the
robberies and the police terminated the interrogation. More than two hours later, a different
officer repeated the Miranda warnings and questioned Mosley about an unrelated murder.
In response to the questioning, Mosley implicated himself in the murder.
132. See Miranda, 348 U.S. at 474 (holding that "[i]f the individual states that he
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present").
133. 423 U.S. at 102.
134. Id. at 104.
135. Id. at 106-07.
136. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
137. See Sonenshein, supra note 72, at 432.
138. See 384 U.S. at 475 (recognizing that "[a]n express statement that the individual
is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver").
139. 441 U.S. at 373.
140. Id. at 370-71.
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the incriminating statement made to police.14 '
The Supreme Court addressed the waiver question in a different context, but with a similar result, in Fare v. Michael C.142 The
issue in Michael C. was whether a juvenile suspect's request to
speak with his probation officer before undergoing police questioning functioned as an invocation of the juvenile's fifth amendment
rights.' 4 3 The Court distinguished a suspect's request to speak with
a lawyer, which under Miranda triggers the requirement that all
interrogation cease until a lawyer is present,' 44 from a suspect's
request to speak with a probation officer or any other third party.
The Court focused on the critical role of the attorney in the legal
system' 45 and rejected the idea that a juvenile's request for anyone
other than his attorney, regardless of the trustworthiness or reliability of that person, would trigger the rigid Miranda requirements. ' 6 Instead, juvenile courts should consider the request as
merely one factor in a totality of the circumstances determination
of the waiver's validity.'4 7 In this case the Court found a voluntary
and knowing waiver and held the juvenile's incriminating state148
ments admissible.
In contrast to its refusal in Michael C. to recognize an invocation of fifth amendment rights, the Court in Jenkins v. Anderson 49 limited the protections of defendants who exercised their
right to remain silent. 50 The Court had previously held that a
defendant's decision to remain silent after receiving Miranda
warnings could not be used against the defendant in court.' 5' In
Jenkins, however, the Court distinguished the situation in which a
defendant remains silent before arrest and the issuing of Miranda
warnings. Because the government had not induced the accused's
141. Id. at 376.
142. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
143. The Supreme Court held in 1967 that when a juvenile proceeding is the functional equivalent of an adult criminal proceeding, the juvenile defendant should receive the
same constitutional safeguards as a criminal defendant. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
144. 384 U.S. at 774. But see supra text accompanying notes 136-141.
145. 442 U.S. at 719-22.
146. Id. at 723.
147. Id. at 724-25.
148. Id. at 727.
149. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
150. Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 203-04.
151. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Doyle's holding prevents a prosecutor from
impeaching a defendant's exculpatory testimony by referring to the defendant's postarrest
silence. The Court relied on Doyle in its 1986 decision in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.
Ct. 634 (1986), to hold that the use of a defendant's postarrest, postwarnings silence as
evidence of sanity violates due process.
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silence by warning him of his rights, the Court reasoned that
allowing the prosecution to impeach the accused with his prearrest
silence would not be unfair.'5 2 The 1982 decision in Fletcher v.
Weir 1 53 extended the rule in Jenkins to cover the prosecution's references to an accused's silence during the1 54period after his arrest
but before he received Miranda warnings.
D.

Recent Decisions InterpretingMiranda

The tendency of the Burger Court to limit Miranda and deny
its constitutional basis emerged again in two recent decisions. In
New York v. Quarles155 the Court created a "public safety" exception to Miranda'srequirements. Focusing on the potential cost of a
suspect's silence induced by Miranda warnings in cases in which
the public safety is at risk, 156 the Court held that police "reasonafor public safety" could question an
bly prompted by 5concern
7
unwarned subject.'
In Quarles the Court balanced the police officer's need for
answers' 58 against the suspect's need for Miranda protections.
Upon finding the police officer's needs to be greater, the Court admitted the incriminating statement of the unwarned defendant. 5 9
The Quarles holding allowed a prosecutor, for the first time since
Miranda, to use in his case-in-chief a statement obtained from a
criminal defendant in blatant violation of the Miranda requirements. 6 0 Some commentators have applauded Quarles as adopting
152. 447 U.S. at 239-40.
153. 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
154. Id. at 606-07.
155. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
156. Id. at 2632.
157. Id. Justice O'Connor points out in her dissent that Miranda does not hold that
police cannot ask questions necessary to secure the public safety. Instead, Miranda merely
mandates that answers obtained pursuant to unwarned questioning are not admissible
against a criminal defendant. Id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. In Quarles, police apprehended a rape suspect, known to be armed, in a supermarket at 12:30 a.m. An officer chased the suspect to the rear of the store and ordered him
to stop and place his hands over his head. By this time more than three other officers were
on the scene. The officer frisked the suspect, but found no gun. After handcuffing the suspect, the officer asked him for the location of the gun and the suspect directed the police to
some empty cartons where the police found the gun. Only then did the police read the
suspect his Miranda rights. Id. at 2629-30. According to the Court, the threat to public
safety created by the rape suspect was the possibility that the suspect discarded his gun in
the supermarket. The Court suggested that if the police did not locate the gun, an accomplice might use it or an employee or customer might come upon it later. Id. at 2632.
159. Id. at 2632-33.
160. See Note, supra note 41, at 458.
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a common sense approach to the realities of law enforcement;''
others have criticized the Court for failing to define the parameters
of the public safety exception 6 2 and for leaving law enforcement
officials with little guidance as to the circumstances in which they
63
may disregard Miranda.1
While Quarles carved out an ambiguous exception of questionable necessity from Miranda's rule of exclusion, Oregon v.
Elstad'14 completed the task, begun in Michigan v. Tucker,'6 5 of
disassociating Miranda warnings from constitutional rights. In Elstad the Court addressed the admissibility of a confession that was
obtained in conformity with Miranda, but obtained after the accused had made a prior confession without being warned of his
rights.'"e The Court, while recognizing an unwarned statement as
presumptively coerced, reasoned that the presumption "does not
require that the statements or their fruits be disregarded as inherently tainted.' 67 Instead, the Court again resurrected the voluntariness test to determine the admissibility of unwarned statements
given in situations not specifically covered by Miranda.6 8 The
Court apparently considered complete the divorce of Miranda
warnings from constitutional status: "If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda pro161. See Comment, New York v. Quarles: The "PublicSafety" Exception to Miranda,
19 U. RICH. L. REv. 193, 193 (1984) (quoting Rogers, CriminalLaw Decisions of the 1983-84
Term: The Court Reaches Out to Adopt a "Common Sense" Approach, 14 Sup. CT.
RESEARCHER 115, 122 (1984)) (arguing that Quarles is "a legitimate effort ... to reconcile
the realities of effective law enforcement with the often hypertechnical rules of criminal
justice").
162. The facts in Quarles itself provide an apt illustration of the unpredictability of a
court's application of the public safety exception. In deciding the case, the New York Court
of Appeals found "no exigent circumstances posing a threat to public safety." The United
States Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion on the same facts. See Note, supra
note 41, at 459-60.
163. Id. at 458-59. This commentator notes that because Quarles may induce police to
dispense with Mirandawarnings in cases that a court might find outside the bounds of the
public safety exception, the decision may, in some instances, hinder police attempts to
obtain admissible evidence. See also 104 S.Ct. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985).
165. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 121-29.
166. In Elstad police questioned an 18-year-old suspect at his home in connection
with a robbery. The suspect implicated himself in the robbery before receiving any Miranda
warnings. The police then took Elstad to the sheriff's headquarters and read him his
Miranda rights for the first time. Elated consented to speak with the officers and made a
full confession. 105 S. Ct. at 1289. An especially troubling aspect of Elstad lies in the fact
that the defendant did not know, when he confessed for the second time, that his first confession could not be used against him. Id. at 1297.
167. Id. at 1292.
168. Id. at 1293.
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cedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself."' 16 9
In Moran v. Burbine,'1 70 the Supreme Court's most recent deci-

sion delineating the scope of Miranda,the majority opinion reiterated Elstad's conclusion that Miranda warnings are not themselves constitutionally protected rights. 17 In Moran the Court held
that neither Miranda nor the sixth amendment requires police to
inform a suspect of an attorney's attempts to consult with him
and, therefore, that the police's failure to so inform the suspect did
not render invalid his waiver of Miranda rights. 7 The Court characterized its decision as protecting "the ease and clarity of Miranda's application"173 and balancing the competing interests of
the state, with its duty to convict criminals, and the individual suspect, with his right to be free from state-sanctioned coercion. 4
As the preceding survey of fifth amendment self-incrimination
cases illustrates, the Supreme Court's approach in the past fifteen
years has displayed a definite tilt toward loosening some of the
constitutional ropes with which the Warren Court's Miranda decision bound law enforcement officials. While the Burger Court has
not ignored altogether the protections due a criminal defendant's
fifth amendment rights, 175 one certainly could describe the Court's
role in protecting individual rights as passive when compared to
the Warren Court's activist stance. 76
Commentators have advanced various reasons for the Burger
Court's retrenchment. The political conservatism of the Nixon ap169. Id.
170. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
171. Id. at 1143. The Court cited New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), for this proposition, which the Court deemed "well
established."
172. 106 S. Ct. at 1142-43, 1146.
173. Id. at 1143.
174. Id. at 1144.
175. See Israel, supra note 40, at 1324; Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 202.
176. As one commentator put it, the Burger Court "seems content simply to provide a
federal safety net to be used to catch only the most serious infringements upon individual
rights." Comment, supra note 10, at 493.
The Rehnquist Court currently faces an opportunity to determine the stringency of
Miranda's requirements in the context of a defendant's invocation of the right to counsel.
Connecticut v. Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044, cert. granted,54 U.S.L.W. 3761 (May
19, 1986), has been appealed to the Supreme Court for a determination of what Miranda
requires when an accused's reference to an attorney is equivocal. See Note, The Right to
Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal References to an Attorney-Determining What Statements or Conduct Should Constitute an Accused's Invocation of the Right to Counsel, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1159 (1986).
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pointees to the Bench and the increasing popular demands for law
and order are obvious causes for the change in attitude. 17 7 Less obvious, but perhaps more helpful in understanding the Court's decision in a particular case, are the pressures placed on the Burger
Court, or any appellate court for that matter, when asked to overturn a criminal conviction because of a constitutionally prohibited
procedural error. 17 8 When a defendant's factual guilt has been established, the reviewing court's inclination is to stretch or manipulate constitutional principles and precedent to uphold the conviction. The result is usually poorly reasoned opinions and
"precedents that uphold police activity at the outer margin of permissibility."u' Whatever the reasons for the Burger Court's retreat
from Miranda's requirements and principles and for the Court's
narrow interpretation of the scope of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, some state courts have viewed the
Court's retreat as a call to carry Miranda'storch on their own.

IV.

THE STATES' RESPONSES

Over the past ten years a small but growing number of state
courts' 80 have given independent substance to their state constitutions' self-incrimination provisions.' 8' Some of these cases have
177. See Casenote, supra note 72, at 820-21.
178. See Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 154-55.
179. Id.
180. Despite a movement toward independent interpretations of state constitutional
self-incrimination provisions, a majority of state courts continue to follow the Supreme
Court's fifth amendment holdings. See Developments, supra note 10, at 1370. Some state
courts do not even consider their state constitution when deciding self-incrimination issues,
but instead rely solely on federal law for guidance. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 487 N.Y.S.2d
613, 110 A.D.2d 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Commonwealth v. Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d
700 (1971). Other state courts may recognize their state constitution's self-incrimination
clause, but assert that its substantive content is coextensive with the fifth amendments
guarantees as interpreted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Newman v. Stinston, 489 S.W.2d
826 (Ky. 1972); Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 401 A.2d 1021 (1979); State v. Smith, 70
Or. App. 675, 691 P.2d 484 (1984); State v. Wright, 691 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1985). A third group of state court decisions cite the self-incrimination provision of both the
state and federal constitution, but never indicate whether their interpretation of the state
provision is independent of federal constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 461 So.
2d 644 (La. App. 1984); State v. Munson, 489 A.2d 646 (N.H. 1985).
181. The state courts that to date have interpreted their state constitutions' self-incrimination provisions independently of the Supreme Court's fifth amendment holdings
include Alaska, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska
1974); In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985); People v.
Barrios, 166 Cal. App. 3d 732, 212 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1985); People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal. 3d 231,
578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978); Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65,
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held that the state provision provides more extensive protections
than the fifth amendment. 182 This part of the Note will begin by
examining state court decisions that have extended protections beyond those defined in Burger Court decisions interpreting Miranda. This part also will examine state court decisions relying on
state constitutional grounds to decide issues relating to the scope
of the privilege against self-incrimination.
A.

Rejection of Harris v. New York

Burger Court decisions restricting the scope and strength of
Miranda'sholding have triggered many of the expansive, independent interpretations of state constitutional law. " For example,
state courts, in several of the early decisions giving state self-incrimination provisions separate interpretations, rejected the Bur1 84
ger Court's first decision limiting Miranda, Harris v. New York.
In the same year that the Harris court held permissible the prosecution's impeachment use of a statement obtained in violation of
Miranda, the Hawaii Supreme Court relied on Hawaii's constitution to reach the opposite conclusion in State v. Santiago.185 After
discussing Miranda and Harris and after quoting extensively from
Justice Brennan's dissent in Harris, the Hawaii court noted its
impotence to give the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution a different interpretation from that espoused by the
Supreme Court. 188 The Hawaii court, however, did assert its position as "the final arbiter of the meaning of the provisions of the
134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360 (1976); State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233 (1979); State v. Miyaski, 62
Hawaii 269, 614 P.2d 915 (1980); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971);
State in re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978); Attorney Gen. v.
Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 444 N.E.2d 915 (1982); People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 365 N.W.2d
648 (1984); State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295 (N.H. 1985); Commonwealth v. Bussey, 486 Pa.
221, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); State
v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982); In re E.T.C., 141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937 (1982);
Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984). Courts in these states, however, may not
interpret the self-incrimination provisions independently in each case raising self-incrimination issues. See supra note 180.

182. For a discussion of state courts' approaches toward and justifications for independent interpretations, see supra note 45.
183. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 121 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting

that "state courts and legislatures are, as matters of state law, increasingly according protections once provided as federal rights but now increasingly depreciated by decisions of this

Court").
184.
185.
186.

401 U.S. 222 (1971); see supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) (relying on HAwA1i CONST. art. I, § 8).
Id. at 265, 492 P.2d at 664.
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Hawaii Constitution.' ' 8 7 The court also noted the ability of the
state constitution's drafters to fashion "greater protections for
criminal defendants than those given by the United States Constitution."'"" After quoting the self-incrimination clause in the Hawaii Constitution,' 8 9 the court held that Miranda's safeguards had
an independent source in Hawaii's constitution and that unless
those safeguards were followed, the prosecution could use an accused's statements neither in its case-in-chief nor for impeachment
purposes. The court's articulated reasons for its decision were to
encourage police to give Miranda warnings and to preserve the
court's judicial integrity. 190 The court concluded that the interest
in protecting an individual's privilege not to incriminate himself
outweighed society's interest in convicting and punishing all
criminals.' 9 '
Following the lead of Santiago, the high courts of Pennsylvania and California also held that their state constitutions' self-incrimination provisions prohibited the prosecution's impeachment
use of statements violating Miranda. 92 In Commonwealth v.
Triplett'9" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an abbreviated
opinion refusing to apply Harris as Pennsylvania law. The court
based its decision on the state constitution.' In contrast to both
Santiago and Triplett, neither of which cited authoritative state
case law to support their state constitutional interpretations, the
California court's opinion in People v. Disbrow'95 analyzed Califor187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Hawaii's constitutional self-incrimination provision is textually identical to the
fifth amendment of the federal constitution.
190. 53 Hawaii at 266, 492 P.2d at 664. The United States Supreme Court in Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), quoted Justice Brandeis in articulating the "judicial
integrity" rationale for excluding evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right:
"'To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a
private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.'" Id. at 222-23 (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
191. 53 Hawaii at 266-67, 492 P.2d at 664-65.
192. Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held in 1973 that a provision of
Texas' Code of Criminal Procedure made Harris inapplicable as a matter of state law. Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
193. 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
194. Id. at 249, 341 A.2d at 64. The Pennsylvania court merely noted Harris' holding
and quoted from the concurring opinion in a 1973 Pennsylvania case before concluding:
"Lastly, we must point out that our prohibition against the use of constitutionally infirm
statements to impeach the credibility of a criminal defendant testifying in his own behalf is
premised upon Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 9, P.S."
195. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
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nia precedent as a basis for rejecting Harris. Disbrow further differed from Santiago and Triplett, both of which were cases of first
impression, because it overruled a prior California holding 19 that
had adopted Harris as California law.
By overruling the adoption of Harrisin People v. Nudd, 97 the
California court rejected, as a matter of state law, the authority
cited to support Harris.98 The court focused on California courts'
interpretation of Miranda and found that Miranda had established a single, clearcut standard for determining the voluntariness, and hence the admissibility, of a criminal defendant's confession.' 99 Harris and Nudd, by contrast, represented a return to the
old, ambiguous voluntariness test.200 In addition, the court
objected to Harris and Nudd on several policy grounds. The
court's chief concern was the danger that a jury would view impeachment evidence as substantive evidence of guilt, a danger that
might compel defendants to choose not to testify on their own behalf. 20' The court also relied on the deterrence and judicial integrity arguments articulated by the Hawaii court in Santiago.2 02 Following this extensive analysis, the court held that the California
Constitution proscribed the prosecution's impeachment use of any
statement obtained in violation of Miranda and its California
progeny. 203 The decision in Disbrow illustrates both the independent nature of the California Constitution and the California
court's intent to interpret the state constitution and define the
204
rights of California citizens to reflect exclusively state policies.
196. People v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974).
197. Id.
198. 16 Cal. 3d at 109-10, 524 P.2d at 277, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 365. The California court
recognized that, as a matter of federal law, it could not rely on its own interpretation of

federal decisions. The court looked to federal precedent only to determine its persuasiveness
for interpreting California cases as a matter of state law. Id. at n.9.
199. Id. at 111, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367. The court concluded that forcing the accused to make such a choice was "certainly not what Miranda envisaged."
202. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 279-80, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68; see supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
203. 16 Cal. 3d at 113, 545 P.2d at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 268. Thus, the court overruled Nudd and rejected Harris as persuasive authority in California.
204. For further discussion of Disbrow, see 12 TULSA L.J. 412 (1976); 45 U. CiN. L. REV.
724 (1976).
The continued viability of the Disbrow court's interpretation of the California constitution is apparent in the 1985 California Court of Appeals decision in People v. Barrios, 166
Cal. App. 3d 732, 212 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1985). In Barrios the prosecution argued that the
adoption of a constitutional provision ("Proposition 8"), CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(d), which
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Admissibility of Confessions in California and Vermont

The California Supreme Court also has diverged from the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Michigan v. Mosley. 20 5
In People v. Pettingill20 the California court addressed the admissibility of a confession obtained during an interrogation that police
initiated after the defendant twice had refused to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. 0 7 The court discussed a line of California cases 208 that relied on Miranda and held that when police
interrogate suspects who have refused to waive their Miranda
rights, any resulting confessions are inadmissible. While recognizing that Mosley repudiated the California interpretation of
Miranda, the court asserted that respect for the independence of
the California Constitution forbade it to abandon settled applications of the state constitution every time the United States Supreme Court announces changes in its interpretation of the federal
constitution.20 9 Upon concluding that Mosley's rule provided less
permitted the admission in a criminal proceeding of all relevant evidence not excluded by a
statutory evidentiary rule, made Harris' rule applicable in California. The court, however,
focused on § 940 of California's Evidence Code, which provides as follows: "To the extent
that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate
him." The Barrios court concluded that § 940 encompases California precedent on the scope
of the evidentiary rule dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination, 166 Cal. App. 3d
at 743, 212 Cal. Rprt. at 650. Thus, the Disbrow holding stands undisturbed by the adoption
of Proposition 8.
205. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
206. 21 Cal. 3d 231, 578 P.2d 108, 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1978).
207. The defendant in Pettingillwas charged with four counts of burglary. During two
separate attempts at questioning by police, the defendant claimed his right to remain silent.
On his third day in custody, a police detective informed the defendant that his accomplices
in the burglary had confessed and implicated him. The detective then read Pettingill his
Miranda rights and asked him if he wanted to talk. Pettingill's response of "I guess so,
yeah," was taken by the detective as a valid waiver of the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination. Id. at 248, 578 P.2d at 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
208. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971); People v.
Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d
522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969); People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625,
68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968).
209. "Indeed our Constitution expressly declares that 'Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."' 21
Cal. 3d at 248, 578 P.2d at 118, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (citing CAL. CONST. art I, § 24). The
California court further elaborated on the authority and role of United States Supreme
Court decisions in state constitutional interpretation:
In such constitutional adjudication, our first referent is California law and the full panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due. Accordingly, decisions of
the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive
authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California
courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Cali-
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protection to California citizens than did the line of California
cases culminating in Disbrow, the court refused to incorporate
Mosley into California's constitutional law. 10
The Vermont Supreme Court, in a 1982 case, analyzed its
state constitution and the federal constitution separately in interpreting the implications of Miranda. State v. Badger2 1 1 concerned
the admissibility of a confession following Miranda warnings when
police had obtained a prior confession from the accused in violation of Miranda. The Vermont court's holding under both constitutions gives the accused more protection than does the United
States Supreme Court's holding on similar facts three years
later. 12 The Vermont court held that because "[e]vidence obtained
in violation of the Vermont constitution, or as a result of a violation, cannot be admitted at trial as a matter of state law," the
involuntariness of the first confession "tainted" the second confession and rendered it inadmissible.2 13 The court reviewed the history of Vermont law on the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
and its fruits and reached the conclusion that all such evide-'ce
must be suppressed.214 By contrast, the United States Supreme
Court in Oregon v. Elstad21 5 found that neither statements obtained in violation of Miranda nor their fruits need be considered
"inherently tainted" and admitted them for impeachment
2 16
purposes.
fornia law ....
The question is not ... whether the Mosley test "adequately protects" the rights of California citizens, but whether it provides less protection than has
been guaranteed by the California Constitution [in California precedent].
Id. at 248, 578 P.2d at 118-19, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
210. Id. at 249-52, 578 P.2d at 119-21, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 872-74.
211. 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982). The court's holding in Badger relied on VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. 10. The defendant was a sixteen-year-old boy charged with second degree
murder. On the evening of the murder police, without issuing Miranda warnings, interrogated the defendant intensely, in the presence of his father, for 50 minutes before the defendant confessed. After the defendant confessed, an officer read the defendant his rights,
and hours later the defendant signed a waiver of his rights before confessing again.
212. See Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
213. 141 Vt. at 452-53, 450 A.2d at 349.
214. 141 Vt. at 451-53, 450 A.2d at 348-49. The Vermont court noted that one of its
reasons for reviewing the defendant's rights under the Vermont Constitution was to
yield adequate and independent state grounds to support our judgment, thereby giving
a final disposition to some of the claims at issue in this appeal. If our state constitution
is to mean anything, it must be enforced where it is the only law capable of providing a
final answer to a claim, and a party. . . has invoked its protections.
Id. at 449, 450 A.2d at 347.
215. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
216. Id. at 1292-93. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Elstad did distinguish, however,
between second confessions that follow an initial unwarned statement obtained by "overtly
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Waiver Issues and Juveniles' Rights

State courts also have diverged from Supreme Court holdings
on waiver issues 217 in both the adult and juvenile context. In Commonwealth v. Bussey21 8 a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected the holding of North Carolina v. Butler1 9 and held
that the Pennsylvania Constitution2 20 requires an explicit waiver of
rights by a suspect in custody before his subsequent statements
will be admissible into evidence. The Pennsylvania court reasoned
that the requirement of an explicit waiver, in contrast to Butler's
holding, will provide certainty in identifying valid waivers and,
thus, prevent litigation on the issue. Additionally, requiring an
explicit waiver will "impress on an accused the importance of his
decision" without placing any significant burden on police.2 21 Thus,
in Commonwealth v. Bussey a state's policy interests again shape
state constitutional interpretation.
or inherently coercive methods" and those that follow the "disclosure of a 'guilty secret'
freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive question." Justice O'Connor placed
the confession at question in Badger in the former category. Id. at 1295 & n.3. This distinction, however, implicitly rejects Miranda'sassertion that all custodial interrogation not proceeded by warnings is inherently coercive.
217. An issue related to waiver is the standard of proof that courts use to determine
the voluntariness of a waiver. The Supreme Court held in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477
(1972), that a court may use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, a relatively light
burden of proof, in determining the voluntariness issue. In 1980 the Louisiana Supreme
Court relied on Louisiana's constitutional self-incrimination provision to hold that voluntariness must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vernon, 385 So. 2d 200, 204 (La.
1980) (relying on LA. CoNsT. art. I, § 13). Other state courts have adopted the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard on evidentiary grounds. See Developments, supra note 10, at
1374 n.42. In a related vein, the Supreme Court of Alaska held in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d
1156 (Alaska 1985), that the Alaska Constitution's due process clause requires electronic
recording of all suspect interrogations conducted in a place of detention. The court characterized such recordings as "reasonable and necessary safeguard[s], essential to the adequate
protection of the accused's right to counsel, his right against self-incrimination, and, ultimately, his right to a fair trial." Id. at 1159-60 (relying on ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7).
218. 486 Pa. 221, 404 A.2d 1309 (1979).
219. 441 U.S. 369 (1979). See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
220. The court did not specify which provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution compelled its holding, but presumably the court based its decision on the self-incrimination
clause in article I, § 9.
221. 486 Pa. at 231, 404 A.2d at 1314-15. Police arrested the defendant in Bussey in
connection with a murder and advised him of his rights as required by Miranda. Bussey,
however, did not specifically acknowledge that he understood his rights and did not explicitly waive his rights. Fifteen minutes after the arrest, Bussey responded to questioning at
the station house and implicated himself in the murder. For further discussion of Commonwealth v. Bussey, see generally Recent Development, Criminal Law-Waiver-Pennsylvania Constitution Requires an Explicit Waiver of Miranda Rights: Commonwealth v. Bussey, 26 VILL L. REV. 205 (1980), which argues that the Bussey standard will provide neither
greater certainty nor judicial convenience.
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In the area of juvenile waivers,22 2 the Louisiana Supreme
Court interpreted the state's constitution to require special protections for juvenile suspects; these special protections were required
even before the United States Supreme Court ever addressed the
requirements for valid juvenile waivers in Fare v. Michael C.223 In
State in re Dino22 4 the Louisiana court announced that the framers of the Louisiana Constitution, in adopting the state's constitutional self-incrimination provision, 22 5 "intended to adopt the Miranda edicts full-blown and unfettered. . . . in fact, there was an
intention . . . to go beyond Miranda and to require more of the
State. 22' After reflecting on Louisiana's policy of protecting minors from the consequences of their immaturity, the court found
that "the concepts of fundamental fairness embodied in the Declaration of Rights of our constitution require that juveniles not be
permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own. ' ' 227 Thus, the
Louisiana court rejected the totality of the circumstances test that
the United States Supreme Court later adopted in Michael C. Instead, Louisiana prosecutors must show that the juvenile actually
consulted with an attorney or an interested and informed third
party before waiving his right to counsel and privilege against selfincrimination. 2 28 The Louisiana court concluded that imposing an
absolute, objective standard would further the goals of Miranda by
saving courts from the "morass of speculation" that accompanies
the totality of the circumstances test.2 9
222. For a discussion of the various standards of juvenile waiver, see generally Seman,
A Juvenile's Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-A Federal and State
Comparison, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 27 (1982).
223. 442 U.S. 707 (1979). See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
224. 359 So. 2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
225. LA. CONST. art. I, § 13. This provision is part of the Louisiana Constitution
adopted in 1974.
226. 359 So. 2d at 590.
227. Id. at 594.
228. Id. The court's analysis relied in part on § 3.2 of the IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS

PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO POLICE HANDLING

OF JUVENILE PROBLEMS

(1977), which states: "For some investigative procedures, greater constitutional safeguards
are needed because of the vulnerability of juveniles. Juveniles should not be permitted to
waive constitutional rights on their own." Rule 25 of the MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE
prepared by the COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELIN(1969), reaches a similar conclusion. See 359 So. 2d at 593 n.20.
229. 359 So. 2d at 591. Cf. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725 (describing totality of

COURTS
QUENCY

the circumstances test for juvenile waivers). Louisiana courts continue to apply Dino's rule
following the Supreme Court's holding in Michael C.. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 447 So.
2d 1125, 1131 (La. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Rebstock, 418 So. 2d 1306, 1309 (La.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1190 (1982); State v. Hudson, 404 So. 2d 460 (La. 1981).
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In 1982 the Vermont Supreme Court specifically rejected
Michael C. 230 and reached a conclusion similar to that of the Louisiana court. In In re E.T.C.231 the Vermont court recognized the
difficulty a juvenile faces in choosing, without advice, among alternative courses of legal action and considered Vermont cases concerning a juvenile's waiver of rights in court. 3 2 The holding of In
re E.T.C. requires, at minimum, a showing of consultation between
"an independent, impartial, responsible, interested adult" and the
juvenile defendant before a court can find a valid waiver under the
23 3
Vermont Constitution.
Unlike the high courts of Louisiana and Vermont, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Benoit 2 4 adopted Michael
C.'s totality of the circumstances test for juvenile waivers. The
court considered adopting the "interested adult" rule espoused in
Louisiana and Vermont, but dismissed that rule as overly burdensome and rigid.2 8 5 Yet State v. Benoit's description of the totality
of the circumstances test required by the New Hampshire Constitution goes far beyond Michael C. in ensuring that only statements
230. In a different context, the Supreme Court of Montana specifically rejected
Michael C.'s holding that a suspect's request to speak with anyone other than a lawyer did
not serve to invoke the suspect's fifth amendment rights. See supra text accompanying
notes 142-48. Instead, the Montana court held that a suspect who, immediately after police
read him his Miranda rights, asked if he had the right to speak with somebody and later
told police he would like to talk to somebody had invoked his right to counsel under the
Montana Constitution. State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248, 1255 (Mont. 1986) (relying on
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24). The Montana court noted that it previously had interpreted the
Montana Constitution's protections of criminal suspects as being coextensive with federal
constitutional guarantees, but refused to "march lock-step" with the United States Supreme
Court in this case. Id. at 1254-55.
231. 141 Vt. 375, 449 A.2d 937 (1982).
232. Id. at 378, 449 A.2d at 939; see State v. Crepeault, 126 Vt. 338, 341, 229 A.2d 245,
247, (summoning of a juvenile's representative prior to questioning) cert. denied, 389 U.S.
915 (1967); In re Dobson, 125 Vt. 165, 167, 212 A.2d 620, 621 (1965) (holding that minor
accused of crime cannot waive coumsel without a guardian or responsible advisor). These
cases concern only in-court waivers, but the Vermont court applied the same principles to
police interrogation of juvenile suspects.
233. 141 Vt. at 380, 449 A.2d at 940. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
reached a similar conclusion in a curiously-reasoned opinion concerning a juvenile's waiver
of his right to counsel. State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981). The court
was inclined to interpret the West Virginia Constitution as not allowing the juvenile to
waive his right to counsel. But because a state statute implied that the juvenile's right was
indeed waivable, the court accommodated the legislative view by adopting the rule that a
juvenile can waive his right to counsel only upon the advice of counsel. Id. at 203-04.
234. 126 N.H. 6, 490 A.2d 295 (1985) (relying on N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15).
235. Id. at 15-16, 490 A.2d at 302-03. The court feared that a per se rule requiring
consultation with an adult could both pose "onerous financial and administrative burdens"
and "chill the rehabilitative function of the juvenile justice system by restricting the flexibility of action under the statute." Id.
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that follow waivers made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently"
will be admissible against a juvenile defendant. Under the Benoit
standard, the juvenile court must make specific findings regarding
fifteen listed factors in the totality of the circumstances calculus
and must use the findings as a basis for determining the waiver's
36
validity.
In addition, the New Hampshire court set forth a "simplified
juvenile rights form"2 37 for police officers to use when dealing with
juveniles. Although the failure to use such a form is not by itself
fatal to admissibility, the court indicated that when making findings regarding the circumstances of a waiver, a court should presume a nonsimplified explanation of rights to be inadequate. 3 8
Finally, Benoit's protections exceed Michael C.'s by requiring that
a juvenile defendant be informed of any possibility of standing
trial in criminal, rather than juvenile, court and the consequences
thereof. 23 9 Thus, Benoit provides an excellent example of a case in
which a state court interpreting a state constitution's self-incrimination provision expands rather than rejects a Supreme Court
holding.
D.

ProsecutorialReferences to Silence

State courts, relying on state constitutional provisions, have
augmented federal law restrictions on a prosecutor's ability to refer
at trial to an accused's exercise of his right to remain silent.
236. Id. at 18-19, 490 A.2d. at 304. The court listed the following factors as relevant to
determining the validity of a juvenile's waiver:
(1) the chronological age of the juvenile; (2) the apparent mental age of the juvenile; (3)
the educational level of the juvenile; (4) the juvenile's physical condition; (5) the juvenile's previous dealings with the police or court appearances; (6) the extent of the
explanation of rights; (7) the language of the warnings given; (8) the methods of interrogation; (9) the length of interrogation; (10) the length of time the juvenile was in
custody; (11) whether the juvenile was held incommunicado; (12) whether the juvenile
was afforded the opportunity to consult with an adult; (13) the juvenile's understanding of the offense charged; (14) whether the juvenile was warned of possible transfer to
adult court; and (15) whether the juvenile later repudiated the statement.
Id. at 15, 490 A.2d at 302.
237. Id. at 18, 490 A.2d at 304. The New Hampshire court appended to its opinion a
sample "Juvenile Rights Form" for police to use in interrogating juvenile suspects. The form
directs police to read the suspect a series of simplified explanations of his constitutional
rights, each of which is followed by the question, "Do you understand this right?" The form
also provides separate spaces for a defendant to acknowledge his understanding of the
explanation and to waive his rights. Id. at 22-24, 490 A.2d 306-07.
238. Id. at 18, 490 A.2d at 304.
239. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Weir2 40 held that a
prosecutor's reference to an unwarned criminal defendant's postarrest silence was permissible, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Turner"4 held otherwise. The Pennsylvania
court cited several Pennsylvania cases that noted the tendency of
juries to equate a claim of silence with an admission of guilt and
reasoned that the substantial prejudice to the defendant resulting
from a reference to his silence far outweighed any probative value
of the reference. 242 The Turner court rejected Fletcher, asserting
that under the Pennsylvania Constitution Miranda warnings,
whether given or not, do not affect "a person's legitimate expectation not to be penalized for exercising the right to remain
silent.

'2 43

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reached the same conclusion
in Westmark v. State.44 Citations to Wyoming law supported the
court's conclusion that "[i]n Wyoming, the question of whether or
not the defendant was advised of his constitutional right to remain
silent is not relevant to his assertion of this right." Thus, the court
held that Wyoming's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination carries with it the "implicit assurance" that silence will not
24 5
result in penalty.
240.
241.

455 U.S. 603 (1982).
499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537 (1982).
242. Id. at 583, 454 A.2d at 539.
243. Id. at 584, 454 A.2d at 540 (relying on PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9). The court, however,
held that the prosecution could impeach a defendant with his silence if the fact of silence
was inconsistent with the defendant's testimony at trial. Id. at 583, 454 A.2d at 539-40.
244. 693 P.2d 220 (Wyo. 1984). The Supreme Court of West Virginia also seems to
have reached this conclusion, but its holding is not entirely clear. In State v. Oxier, 338
S.E.2d 360 (W. Va. 1985), the court considered the constitutionality of a prosecutor's reference to both a suspect's prearrest silence and his postarrest, postwarnings silence. The court
held that the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's pretrial silence was reversible error
under the West Virginia Constitution's self-incrimination and due process provisions, id. at
360 (relying on W. VA. CONsT. art. III, §§ 5, 10), but did not make clear whether its holding
applied equally to both instances of pretrial silence. Although the court's opinion noted the
holding of Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), which allowed reference to prearrest
silence, the court did not reject the federal decision explicitly in deciding the case on state
constitutional grounds. Indeed, the West Virginia court could have reached the same outcome in the case simply by relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 61 (1976), which prohibited
prosecutorial reference to the defendant's postarrest, postwarnings silence.
245. 693 P.2d at 222. See Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1978), overruled in
Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982); Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo. 1976);
Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1973). In Westmark the Wyoming court overruled
Richter and returned to the rule of Clenin.
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Issues of Scope

The preceding cases illustrate the extent to which state courts,
by relying on their state constitutions, have been able to expand
the constitutionally protected privilege against self-incrimination
that their citizens enjoy. These cases interpret the meanings and
implications, as a matter of state constitutional law, of the
Miranda decision. State courts, however, also have considered selfincrimination issues, such as the types of evidence encompassed by
the privilege against self-incrimination, that are completely separate from the issues raised by Miranda. Cases resolving issues of
scope differently from the Supreme Court's fifth amendment holdings are identified and discussed briefly below.
One question often litigated in state courts but seldom
resolved differently from the federal rule concerns the admissibility of compelled real evidence, such as handwriting exemplars,
blood tests, or breath tests. The United States Supreme Court held
2 4
in Schmerber v. California
that the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination extends only to evidence testimonial in
nature and does not protect an accused from having to produce
real evidence to be used against him. 4 7 In 1983 the Court resolved
an issue left open in Schmerber, holding that an accused's refusal
to take a blood-alcohol test was admissible under the fifth
amendment. 4 8
A few state courts have interpreted language in their state
constitutions that differs from fifth amendment language as reflecting the drafters' intent to provide broader protection to an accused.2 49 Nonetheless, state decisions holding that real evidence is
covered by the state's privilege against self-incrimination have
been short lived. 50 Only Georgia courts continue to hold that the
246. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
247. Id. at 765.
248. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
249. See infra note 270 and accompanying text for a breakdown of the wording of selfincrimination provisions in state constitutions. Compare Williams, supra note 45, at 369
(stating that "[a] substantial textual difference between the federal and state constitution is
the most persuasive reason for a state court to reject a United States Supreme Court decision"), with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 761-62 n.6 (noting that a difference in
phraseology does not change the scope of the privilege because "the manifest purpose of the
constitutional provisions, both of the States and of the United States, is to prohibit the
compelling of testimony of a self-incriminating kind").
250. See Trammell v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S.W.2d 487 (1956) (holding blood
sample taken without the defendant's consent inadmissable), overruled in Olson v. State,
484 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980) (compelling the defendant to produce handwriting sample violates UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12),
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state constitution prohibits the state from forcing an accused to do
any affirmative act to produce evidence against himself.2 51 Furthermore, no state has interpreted its constitution as proscribing
prosecutorial reference to a defendant's refusal to produce real
2 52
evidence.
The issue of what type of immunity is necessary to protect a
compelled witness' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination also has provoked independent interpretations of the privilege
under state constitutions. The 1972 United States Supreme Court
case of Kastigarv. United States25s held that an immunity statute
prohibiting the use or derivative use 2 5 4 of a witness' compelled testimony in a criminal proceeding satisfies the requirements of the
fifth amendment.2 55 By contrast, the high courts of Hawaii and
Massachusetts have held that their state constitutions' privilege
against self-incrimination requires a grant of transactional immunity to a compelled witness. 5 6
The permissible scope of prosecutorial discovery is the final
area of independent state resolution of self-incrimination issues
not related to Miranda. The 1970 United States Supreme Court
case of Williams v. Florida257 upheld the constitutionality of notice-of-alibi statutes25 under the fifth amendment. The supreme
courts of Alaska and California, however, have declared such statutes violative of state self-incrimination provisions. 259 The Alaska
overruled in American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985).
251. See State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233 (1979) ("forcing a defendant to produce ... handwriting is not sanctioned" by GA. CONST. art. I, sec. I, para. XIII).
252. Cf. Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1984); People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill.
2d 137, 461 N.E.2d 410 (1984); State v. Wright, 691 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
253. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
254. A grant of use and derivative use immunity to a witness prohibits the evidence he
gives, or any leads directly or indirectly derived therefrom, from being used against him in a
subsequent criminal proceeding. The grant, however, does not protect completely the witness from subsequent prosecution relating to the subject matter of his testimony. By contrast, a grant of transactional immunity gives a witness an absolute shield against prosecution for any event or transaction about which he is compelled to furnish evidence.
255. 406 U.S. at 453.
256. See State v. Miyasaki, 62 Hawaii 269, 614 P.2d 915 (1980) (relying on HAwAII
CONST. art. 1, § 10); Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 387 Mass. 790, 444 N.E.2d 915 (1982).
257. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
258. Notice-of-alibi rules require a defendant, upon demand of the prosecutor, to give
notice before trial if the defendant plans to claim an alibi. In addition, a defendant is
required to provide the prosecutor with the names and addresses of those he will call as alibi
witnesses and with information about the location at which he claims to have been. See id.
at 79.
259. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974) (relying on ALASKA CONST. art. I, §
9); Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976) (relying on
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court held unconstitutional any statute requiring disclosure of information, such as the names of witnesses, beyond mere notice of
intent to present an alibi defense. 6 0 The California court interpreted the state constitution's self-incrimination clause to prohibit
any compelled pretrial disclosure by the accused that might make
261
it easier for the prosecution to prove its case-in-chief.
The California Supreme Court applied this same standard in
rejecting the United States Supreme Court's ruling in United
States v. Nobles.2 62 Nobles held that the fifth amendment privilege, because of its personal nature, did not prohibit compelling an
accused to disclose, before trial, reports of the defense's conversations with defense witnesses. 6 3 In 1985 the California court
reached an opposite conclusion in In re Misener.2 " In Misener the
court held that a provision allowing the prosecution to discover
prior statements by defense witnesses violated the California Constitution's self-incrimination provisions. 265
V.

POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL

INDEPENDENCE

The majority of state courts deciding self-incrimination issues
continue merely to track Supreme Court holdings.266 Yet state law
provides a fertile source that state courts may use to supplement,
rather than mimic, federal law on the privilege against self-incrimination. 267 Forty-eight of the individual states have state constitutions containing self-incrimination provisions. 6 8 State courts may
interpret these provisions as a matter of state law to provide proCAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15).
260. 519 P.2d at 785. The Alaska Supreme Court emphasized its ability to go beyond
the United States Supreme Court's ruling and provide broad protections for the rights of
Alaskan citizens. The court focused on whether such action was called for by "the intention
and spirit of our local constitutional language and [is] necessary for the kind of civilized life
and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage." (quoting Baker v.
City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970)).
261. 18 Cal. 3d at 525, 557 P.2d at 67, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
262. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
263. Id. at 234.
264. 38 Cal. 3d 543, 698 P.2d 637, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985).
265. Id. at 557-58, 698 P.2d at 647-48, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80 (relying on CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 15).
266. See, e.g., cases listed supra note 180.
267. Some state courts have assumed the responsibility of interpreting their state constitutions independently of federal law to protect the liberties of state citizens. These state
court decisions stand as examples to other state courts that have not yet considered giving
independent content to state self-incrimination provisions.
268. Iowa and New Jersey are the exceptions.
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tections either coextensive with or broader than fifth amendment
protections.8 9 State constitutional provisions are variously worded,
but a majority use language different from the fifth amendment. 70
Although the relevance of these differences in phrasing for purposes of constitutional interpretation is debatable,2 71 textual differ-

ences are one of many factors that a state court may consider in
interpreting its own constitutional provision.2 72

Several considerations may lead a state court to interpret the
state's self-incrimination clause more broadly than the fifth
amendment. Foremost among these considerations is the Burger
Court's policy 27 3 of restrictively interpreting fifth amendment pro-

tections and diluting Miranda's impact-a policy that is unlikely
to change under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist 174 New
Supreme Court holdings also may cause divergent interpretations
in a different way. When a state court addresses an issue that is
unsettled as a matter of federal constitutional law, the court may
base its decision on parallel interpretations of the state and federal
constitutions. If the United States Supreme Court subsequently
addresses the issue and decides that the federal constitution compels a different conclusion, the state decision will be left standing
solely on state grounds. When the state court faces the issue again
269. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
270. According to State v. Picknell, 142 Vt. 215, 227, 454 A.2d 711, 716 (1982), the
wording of self-incrimination provisions in state constitutions breaks down as follows: 21 use
the phrase "to give evidence"; 15 use the phrase "witness against himself" (the phrase contained in the fifth amendment); 8 use the phrase "testify against himself"; and the remaining 4 states use miscellaneous wording.
271. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
272. For one court's list of relevant factors, see supra note 45.
273. Justice Brennan suggests that the federalist principle that the states should independently protect the liberties of their citizens may have induced in part the Burger Court's
retrenchment. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 502-03.
274. Many of the independent state court interpretations discussed in Part IV of this
Note represent reactions to Burger Court holdings limiting the scope of the Miranda decision and the fifth amendment generally. Recent Burger Court decisions like New York v.
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984), see supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text, and Oregon
v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985), see supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text, continue to
dilute Miranda'simpact. As state courts confront the issues resolved as a matter of federal
constitutional law in those and any other forthcoming Supreme Court cases, more state
courts may wish to interpret their state constitutions as requiring different conclusions. Furthermore, any additional turnover on the Supreme Court during the Reagan administration
may leave the Court even more decidedly conservative and more likely to reduce the current
level of federal protection provided to criminal defendants under the fifth amendment. See
Comment, supra note 10, at 495. Thus, the path of the Supreme Court may encourage states
that have to date simply followed federal law in self-incrimination cases to begin interpreting their state constitutions independently.
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following the Supreme Court's holding, the court must decide
whether to continue to interpret its constitution differently from
the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. If the state
court originally analyzed its state constitutional provision as logically independent of the fifth amendment, a subsequent Supreme
Court decision is not likely to influence the state holding. When
the original state decision makes no distinction between the state
and federal constitutions, however, the independence of the state
interpretation is less clear and its continued viability is less
certain.
A timely example of this situation is not difficult to find. In
1979 the Oregon Supreme Court held that when an attorney seeks
to consult with a suspect who is in custody and who has previously
waived his general right to counsel, then unless the police inform
the suspect of the availability of a specific attorney wishing to
speak with him, any subsequent statement by the suspect and the
fruits thereof will be inadmissible.2 75 The Oregon court based its
decision on the fifth amendment and the Oregon Constitution's
self-incrimination provision.2 76 In 1985 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit relied on the fifth amendment to
reach the same result on similar facts in Moran v. Burbine.2 7 7 The
United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the First Circuit
in Moran2 78 and held that the failure of police to inform a suspect
of an attorney's attempts to reach him did not vitiate the suspect's
waiver of his Miranda rights. Thus, the Court's ruling strips the
Oregon decision of its federal grounds. If called on again to decide
the issue, the Oregon Supreme Court will have to decide whether
to stand firm behind its interpretation of the Oregon Constitution.
Cases raising self-incrimination issues on which the Supreme
Court has not ruled also provide state courts with an opportunity
275. State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945
(1980).
276. Id. at 74, 602 P.2d at 279. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, after quoting extensively from Haynes, reached the same conclusion in Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (relying on U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIV and OKL. CONST. art.
II, §§ 7, 20, 21). In State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982), the Louisiana Supreme
Court relied on Louisiana precedent and the Louisiana Constitution in holding that police
failure to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to consult with him rendered subsequent
statements inadmissible. The Louisiana case on which Matthews relied most heavily, however, based its conclusion on the court's reading of Miranda and its progeny. See State v.
Jackson, 303 So. 2d 734 (La. 1974).
277. 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
278. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text; see also Browning, Moran v.
Burbine: The Magic of Miranda, 72 A.BA.J., Jan. 1986, at 58.
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to give their state constitutions an independent reading. For example, in People v. Conte2 7 the Michigan Supreme Court considered
whether a confession induced by a law enforcement official's promise of leniency was involuntary and inadmissible as a violation of
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. The court
examined both Michigan law and federal law and found that
neither had articulated a test for determining the admissibility of
such a confession.280 As a result, the court created its own constitutional test to "comport[ I with the constitution, the common law,
and public policy."'2 81 Thus, Conte's independent interpretation of
the Michigan Constitution filled a void in existing law.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the self-incrimination provisions in state constitutions
present state courts with a rich opportunity to develop a constitutional jurisprudence reflecting state policies and legal traditions.
The current failure of the majority of state courts to exploit this
potential may reflect a genuine, considered concurrence with federal law.28 2 The failure, however, also may result from lack of
impetus.2 8 3 In either case, state court mimicking of federal law
leaves the state constitution's self-incrimination provision void of
independent content and leaves the state's citizens dependent
solely on federal law for protection of their fundamental liberties.
This result is antithetical to the federal system of government.
The past decade has witnessed a resurgence in state constitutional jurisprudence. After languishing during the Warren Court's
expansive reading of the federal constitution's guarantees of fundamental liberties, state courts now are reexamining and reinterpreting analogous state constitutional guarantees. Largely in reaction to federal court passivity, some state courts are interpreting
279. 421 Mich. 704, 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984).
280. Id. at 738-39, 365 N.W.2d at 662.
281. Id. at 749, 365 N.W.2d at 667 (relying on MICH. CONST. art 1, § 17) (holding confession inadmissible).
282. See Note, supra note 14, at 200.
283. For the most part courts rely on attorneys to raise and argue issues. Attorneys,
therefore, have a large role to fill in the expansion of state constitutional interpretation. In a
recent case the Vermont Supreme Court directed attorneys who raised a state constitutional
law issue to file supplemental briefs addressing the issue; in doing so, the court emphasized
the attorney's role in the development of state constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, the
responsibility rests with the bar to raise self-incrimination arguments grounded in state constitutional law for state courts to decide. See State v. Jewett, 37 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2409
(Vt. Aug. 9, 1985); cf. State v. Smith, 70 Or. App. 675, 680, 691 P.2d 484, 487 (1984) (warning that court will not decide state constitutional issue not raised by attorneys).
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their state constitutions as exceeding the federal constitution in
protecting individual liberties.
In Miranda v. Arizona the Warren Court read the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination as requiring strict
procedural safeguards for the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant undergoing custodial interrogation. By contrast, subsequent Burger Court decisions have diluted the impact of Miranda
by limiting Miranda's broad language to the case's specific facts,
by denying the constitutional nature of Miranda's requirements,
and by creating exceptions to Miranda's exclusionary rule. In response to Burger Court decisions limiting Miranda, some state
courts have interpreted the content of their state constitution's
self-incrimination provisions as diverging from the fifth amendment. These state courts have concluded in a variety of situations
that the state's constitutional history and policy concerns mandate
that a criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination enjoy protections broader than those guaranteed by the fifth
amendment.
State courts reading state self-incrimination clauses independently of the fifth amendment remain in the minority. Yet a dissatisfaction with the shrinking federal protection of the fifth
amendment privilege and a need to resolve new issues that arise
may prompt more state courts to give their state provisions independent meaning. Instead of continuing to settle self-incrimination
issues solely by resort to federal constitutional law, state courts
should look to their state constitutions as an additional source of
authority. In some cases the court may find that the state provision compels the same result as the fifth amendment. In other
cases the court may interpret the state's self-incrimination clause
as providing state citizens with protections broader than those
guaranteed by the federal constitution. Either result is as preferable as the other. Vital to federal theory, however, is state court
recognition and independent, substantive interpretation of self-incrimination provisions in state constitutions.
State courts willing to rely on the state constitution and to
take a stand on self-incrimination issues deserve praise. By guaranteeing that state citizens benefit from an additional layer of protection from governmental encroachment on their liberties, these
state courts put into action the ideals of federalism. Only by giving
content to all state constitutional provisions, not merely those
without federal analogues, may state courts fulfill their role as the
ultimate interpreters of the state constitutions.
Mary A. Crossley

